Registration, Fairness, and General Jurisdiction

I. Introduction II. In the Beginning Was “Presence” III. When “Presence” Ceased to Mean “Presence” IV. What’s “Fairness” Got to Do with It? V. The Doctrine of General Jurisdiction After International Shoe ... A. Perkins. v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. ... B. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall VI. The Death of General Jurisdiction? ... A. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown … B. Daimler v. Bauman VII. Registration and General Jurisdiction ... A. Introduction ... B. Circuit Split: Pre-Daimler, Post-International Shoe … C. Post-Daimler Cases Concluding that Consent-By-Registration Is a Valid Basis for the Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction ... D. Post-Daimler Cases Concluding that Consent-By-Registration Is Not a Valid Basis for the Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction VIII. Conclusion: A Middle Pat

Erie SLAPP Back

Dozens of states have enacted anti-Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP) laws to counter SLAPP suits, or lawsuits filed to silence a defendant who has spoken out against a plaintiff. The primary goal of a SLAPP suit is not to win on the merits, but rather to discourage the defendant from exercising their right to free speech by threatening excessively expensive litigation. State anti-SLAPP laws provide for special motions to dismiss, discovery limitations, and fee shifting, all designed to allow a defendant to expeditiously dispose of the SLAPP suit before engaging in costly discovery. This Article discusses the development of state anti-SLAPP laws and the evolution of the Erie doctrine through the Shady Grove decision, ultimately examining how lower courts have struggled to make sense of Shady Grove in the context of state anti-SLAPP special motions to dismiss. This Article then discusses the various theoretical solutions that have been offered for this dilemma, concluding that the conflict between state anti-SLAPP laws and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is unavoidable and irreconcilable under the Rules Enabling Act and Erie and its progeny. Based on this analysis, this Article concludes that federal courts sitting in diversity cannot apply state anti-SLAPP laws. The only mechanism for accomplishing the specifically defined purpose of state anti-SLAPP laws in federal court is for the Congress to adopt a federal anti-SLAPP law that would supplement the operation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Because of Sex

Many Americans currently believe that federal law prohibits discrimination because of sexual orientation and gender identity in the workplace. While it is true that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) prohibits employers from discriminating because of an employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, courts and legislators have historically been slow to extend these protections to LGBT workers. The result of this reluctance is that LGBT employees remain largely unprotected under an unpredictable patchwork of laws and policies, consisting of presidential executive orders, private employer initiatives, city and county ordinances, gubernatorial executive orders, and state legislation. As a result, discrimination in the workforce remains a constant in the lived experience of LGBT persons. As of 2016, thirty-two states and the District of Columbia had taken some steps, either legislatively or through executive action, to limit or prohibit workplace discrimination on the bases of gender identity or sexual orientation. Yet even among these states, victims of workplace discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity were provided redress through a private right of action in only twenty-two states and the District of Columbia. Section I of this article discusses this background. Section II article discusses development of the prohibition against discrimination “because of sex” that is contained in Title VII, including the legislative history of Title VII and the initial interpretations of the meaning of “because of sex” in the Title VII context. Section III is focused on general questions regarding the applications of Title VII to claims of discrimination based on sexual orientation, with Sections IV and V focused more specifically on treatment by the EEOC and the courts, respectively, of the question of whether Title VII prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation. Section VI, the concluding section of this article, examines the theories through which Title VII has been seen by courts to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. Ultimately, this article attempts to propose a unified theory under which discrimination based on sexual orientation would be included under Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination “because of sex.

Emerging From Davy Jones’ Locker: The Revival of Counterclaims Against Government in Civil Forfeiture Actions

The thesis of this Article is that a claimant in a civil forfeiture proceeding can assert a counterclaim against the United States government. This assertion is based upon the scope of the Supplemental Rules and in rem jurisdiction

At Long Last Marriage

Legal history of gay marriage in the United States. Creator Jack B. Harrison, faculty in Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky University

Registration, Fairness, and General Jurisdiction

Creator Jack B. Harrison, faculty in Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky University

At Long Last Marriage

Legal history of gay marriage in the United States. Creator Jack B. Harrison, faculty in Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky University